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The European Commission’s Expert Groups:  
Adapting to the Contestation of Expertise 
 
Elissaveta Radulova, Aneta Spendzharova, Johanna Breuer  
 
1. Introduction 
Policy-makers have to find feasible solutions to ever more complex and multi-faceted 
problems, ranging from the need to foster social integration in increasingly diverse societies 
to protecting critical infrastructures from cyber-attacks and regulating the use of digital 
currencies, to name just a few. To tackle these challenges, policy-makers seek out expert 
advice, which has become indispensable, considering the persisting complexity and 
uncertainty in the policy environment. Experts1 possess specialised knowledge and can reduce 
complexity by appropriately framing the problems and putting forward policy solutions, 
drawing on their accumulated theoretical and practical knowledge. They can help to manage 
uncertainly by providing detailed analysis and by applying standard routines based on 
previous experience (Craft and Howlett, 2013, p. 191). Experts also offer “a methodology for 
arbitrating between competing truth claims” (Herwig, 2014, p. 197). According to Ambrus et 
al. (2014), expert involvement is an important tool for increasing the legitimacy of decision-
making. On the one hand, the inclusion of experts leads to a careful consideration of various 
policy alternatives and to a higher quality of the adopted decisions, thus ensuring input and 
output legitimacy. On the other hand, experts’ involvement enhances throughput legitimacy 
due to the inclusiveness, transparency and the deliberative nature of the decision-making 
process (Ambrus et al., 2014, pp. 5-6). Owing to this effect of increased legitimacy, over time, 
 
1 According to Grundmann and Stehr (2011, p. 40) experts are “mediators between producers of knowledge and 




the systematic inclusion of expert advice has become a key component of contemporary 
governance.  
The legitimacy of expert advice has, however, come under attack in the current post-truth 
debate which challenges the assumption about the positive role of expertise in the policy-
making process. Political actors such as Michael Gove (see Mance, 2016; White, 2016) have 
questioned the authoritative position of experts and countered evidence-based arguments with 
“alternative facts,” as exemplified by Nigel Farage (Gillet, 2017) and Donald Trump (for an 
extensive discussion see Nichols, 2017). In essence, this indicates a strong perception among 
some politicians that experts are strategically used by policy-makers to justify political 
choices – a message which they have also expressed in election rallies and media campaigns 
aimed at the general public. Particularly successful in this context was Beppe Grillo in Italy 
who amplified the message that expert-based technocratic policy solutions are several steps 
removed from the concerns of ‘ordinary citizens’. These rhetorical ‘efforts’ have led to 
undermining the authority of expert advice in public debates and have important implications 
for the general public’s trust in political institutions.  
Considering all of the above, it is important to investigate the main adaptation pathways 
undertaken in the EU political institutions in response to these challenges. In this chapter, we 
zoom onto a core source of expertise at the EU institutional level – the European 
Commission’s expert groups (EGs) – and we aim to capture the trends during the period 
2013-2018. Given the Commission’s extensive use of and heavy dependence on expert advice 
the puzzle inspiring this research is to investigate empirically how the European Commission 
has adapted its expert group structures to the current shift toward greater contestation of 
expertise and expert advice in the public sphere. We selected the European Commission as the 
focus of our study due to its central role in the EU agenda-setting process: “in any political 
system, how policies are initially formulated and packaged has a strong bearing on eventual 
outcomes” (Princen & Rhinard, 2006, p. 1119). Moreover, this is the institution that relies 
most extensively on expert input while drafting legislative and policy proposals. The five-year 
period was selected to capture any changes that have taken place while the complex system of 
EGs has experienced increased scrutiny and legitimacy critiques. We take into account the 
growing structural contestation in the European policy environment (see Introduction by 
Abazi et al., 2018). This form of contestation is raised by stakeholder groups which criticise 
the lack of transparency, the structural biases or the privileged position of certain expert views 
over others in institutionalised decision-making. Typically, the contestation lines are between 
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representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society groups on the 
one hand and business interests or industrial capital on the other hand. 
This chapter is structured as follows: to begin with, section 2 outlines the state of the art, 
the research design of the study, the case selection and the data sources. In section 3, we 
examine the broad trends in the entire EG system and across all Commission DGs. Section 4 
presents two case studies which allow us to investigate the concrete adaptation pathways to 
the contestation of expertise at the level of individual expert groups. Lastly, section 5 
summarises the main findings of the chapter. 
2. State of the art and research design 
 
The Commission is at the heart of EU policy-making, charged with the crucial role to initiate 
legislation for the complex EU system of multi-level governance. Throughout the decades of 
European integration, the Commission has systematically resorted to external expert advice. 
Its permanent staff of about 33,000 civil servants2 is advised by 23,491 experts3 divided 
among 770 expert groups. In other words, the Commission is a relatively small bureaucratic 
organisation, which has to address the “functional demands of an ever-expanding European 
Community for technical information and expertise” (Vos, 1999, p. 19) and, therefore, 
depends on input from external experts.  Figure 1 displays the total number of Commission 
expert groups since 1985. 
Figure 1: Number of Commission expert groups, 1985-2018 
 
 
2 European Commission (2018): https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/figures/administration_en (accessed 
on 10 February 2018). 
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Sources: Metz (2013); Blomeyer and Sanz (2015); Authors’ own calculation based on 
Commission data 
As highlighted by Metz (2013, p. 269), expert groups can be viewed as an important 
asset for the Commission to manage its complex policy environment and to acquire the 
resources demanded to perform its tasks. One of the core functions of the expert groups is to 
increase the problem-solving capacity of the Commission’s decision-making. This mode of 
knowledge utilisation is known as instrumental (Schrefler, 2010, p. 315), meaning that 
scientific expertise provides specialised information that fosters a collective discussion and 
search for scientifically-based solutions to existing problems (see also Haas, 1992, p. 2). In 
this context, information is used as factual evidence to solve a policy problem (Weiss, 1979). 
Scholars have also identified other forms of expert knowledge utilisation. Next to 
instrumental, there is also a strategic use of expertise with two modalities – a substantiating 
and a legitimising one (Schrefler, 2010, p. 315). A substantiating function is observed when 
expert advice is used to promote and/or justify predetermined policy preferences and provide 
reasons for an already defined course of action. A legitimising function is observed when 
expert advice is used to lend greater credibility to the decision-making process and policy 
outcomes. In this context, the involvement of experts is symbolic and primarily taps into the 
experts’ reputation for reliable scientific advice, rather than into their substantive knowledge 
and careful analysis. Based on Schrefler’s analysis (2010, p. 321), under conditions of high 
contestation, such as in the current period of post-truth politics, we expect to find less 
instrumental and a more strategic use of expertise. 
Similarly to Schrefler’s (2010) approach, Metz (2013, p. 270) views the expert groups 
as an important arena for the articulation of policy opinions of a variety of relevant 
stakeholders. She highlights three different uses of expertise in the policy process: a problem-
solving use, a substantiating one and a consensus-building one. Firstly, the problem-solving 
use is rather technocratic and refers to drawing on experts’ factual and practical knowledge 
and insights when drafting legislation (Metz, 2013, p. 271). Secondly, in the substantiating 
mode, the Commission uses the information provided more strategically to substantiate its 
positions and justify a preferred course of action. Thirdly, in the consensus-building mode, the 
Commission values experts and their knowledge, but it primarily seeks to bring together 
diverse viewpoints in a more formal institutional setting and identify possible agreements that 
can serve as the basis for widely accepted legislation (Metz, 2013, p. 272). In the third mode, 
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the expert groups’ institutional context facilitates negotiations based on open communication 
and trust, thus, helping to accommodate diverging interests. 
Existing studies have reached different conclusions about the observed mix of the 
instrumental and strategic use of expert knowledge by the Commission. Rimkute and 
Haverland (2015) find that the strategic use of knowledge, albeit present, is not highly 
prominent in the process of legislative proposal drafting. On the contrary, they report that the 
instrumental use is perceived as dominant by the scientific contributors to deliberations. By 
contrast, other scholars (Hartlapp, 2015; Radulova and Mkheidze, 2015) have found 
increasing politicisation of the Commission and, consequently, a more strategic political use 
of external experts.  
Against this backdrop, the aim of our contribution is to provide a theoretically-informed 
exploratory study of how the Commission has adapted its expert group structures to the 
contestation of expertise against the backdrop of the post-truth debates. Particularly, we focus 
on one commonly advanced claim when contesting expert advice, namely, that expert groups 
are prone to “corporate capture” by powerful industry groups. If this claim is valid, the 
composition of the expert groups would show a dominance of corporate or business interests 
vis-à-vis smaller companies, public actors, NGOs or academic experts. We probe the claim at 
two levels of analysis: first, in section 3 we survey macro level changes and, second, in 
section 4 we investigate in-depth the micro level dynamics in two specific expert groups. This 
set-up allows us to examine systematically the adaptation pathways of the Commission’s 
expert groups system to the greater contestation of expertise. 
To conduct the analysis, section 3 examines the system of expert groups as a whole, based 
on primary Commission documents, quantitative data extracted4 from the Register of the 
Commission’s expert groups, interviews and the existing academic literature. We draw on 
statistical data about the number and composition of the expert groups found in: Larsson 
(2003), Larsson and Murk (2007), Gornitzka and Sverdrup (2008, 2011) and Metz (2013, 
2015). The most recent and comprehensive study on this topic was commissioned by the 
European Parliament and executed by Blomeyer and Sanz (2015), which we supplemented 
with the most recent data from 2018.  
 
4 The Register data are from the 6 February 2018 and were provided by the General Secretariat of the 
Commission Unit B2. 
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After the survey of macro level changes in section 3, section 4 focuses on the micro level 
dynamics in two expert groups. The case selection is based on high societal interest and media 
attention. Moreover, the selected expert groups advise on important sectors of the economy, 
which deal with highly specialised and complex issues and generate a high level of structural 
contestation. Given the high contestation and the large degree of public scrutiny, these can be 
considered most likely cases to find systematic adaptation in the work of the expert groups. 
The concrete EGs were selected from the Register of Commission Expert Groups applying the 
search criteria for an active expert group and containing type C experts (the category 
encompassing corporate actors). The following two expert groups were selected for further 
examination after excluding ad-hoc and informal or too narrowly technical EGs: 
• E03485 - High-Level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance 
• E02611 - Expert Group on the exchange of information on Best Available Techniques 
related to industrial emissions (IED Article 13 Forum)  
Next to high issue salience and contestation, the two case studies represent Commission 
Directorate-Generals (DGs) which are quite active in the EU legislative process: DG FISMA 
and DG ENV (see Figure 2). In DG FISMA we observe a pronounced reduction in the 
consulted expert groups from 26 in 2013 to 17 in 2018. While in the past DG ENV was one of 
the most active DGs to consult expert groups, during the studied period the number of EGs for 
this DG has oscillated between 50 and 60.  
 
Figure 2: Number of expert groups consulted by DG ENV and DG FISMA, 2013-2018 
 

















3. The (changing) landscape of the European Commission expert groups  
 
The Commission expert groups play an important advisory role in the agenda-setting and 
policy formulation stages of the policy process when the Commission drafts legislative and 
policy proposals.5 This section examines the changes in the pre-legislative advisory structures 
of the Commission in response to the challenges of the post-truth period. In sub-section 3.1. 
we summarise the efforts to ensure greater transparency, such as the establishment and 
subsequent reforms of the Commission’s Register of Expert Groups. The most notable reform 
in this context was the adoption of new Horizontal Rules on the creation and operation of 
Commission Expert Group in 2016 and establishing an obligatory link between the 
Transparency Register and the Register of Expert Groups. Secondly, in sub-section 3.2. we 
trace the efforts to achieve a more balanced composition between representatives of 
industrial/corporate and civil society/non-governmental interests. The key evidence in this 
respect is the recruitment of experts via public calls as well as the new obligatory link 
between the Transparency Register and the Register of Expert Groups. These measures are 
intended to reduce the likelihood of “corporate capture” of the expert groups.  
 
3.1. The Commission’s Register of Expert Groups as an instrument of transparency 
and accountability in EU expert governance  
 
Blom (this volume) discerns two waves in the scholarship of EU committees – the first wave 
focused on comitology committees, while the second one examines the expert groups. 
Scholarly attention to the Commission’s pre-legislative advisory structures is relatively new 
(Larsson, 2003, p. 127) and it has been particularly challenging to obtain reliable data about 
the active expert groups and their composition. The launch of the Commission’s Register of 
Expert Groups in 2005 considerably improved the access to this data (Larsson and Murk, 
2007, p. 66) and, hence, it also enhanced the transparency of advice provision. In fact, it has 
made new research possible, allowing more systematic and also more critical studies 
(Gornitzka and Sverdrup, 2008, p. 726). The Register currently offers information about the 
active and “on hold” expert groups, their members, mandate, topics of discussion and the 
respective lead DG (European Commission, 2016b, pp. 15-17). All in all, the 2016 reform of 
 
5 Van Balleart (2015) estimated that expert groups assisted the Commmission in preparing about a third of the 




the Register, accomplished through the adoption of the new Horizontal Rules on the creation 
and operation of Commission Expert Groups aimed at a high level of transparency. 
 While the statutory transparency provisions are adequate, their application varies 
substantially between the Commission’s different DGs. Under the current Horizontal Rules, 
the DGs are expected to “ensure publication of the agenda and other relevant background 
documents in due time ahead of the meeting, followed by the timely publication of the 
minutes” (Ibid., Article 26). However, there is a big variation in how different DGs 
implement the provisions. During our own work with the Register, we found that regular 
updates of the documents and information about a group’s activity were often lacking and 
sometimes already uploaded documents were eventually removed.  
In sum, the launching and continuous improvement of the Register via the different 
releases has brought the pre-legislative expert groups into the spotlight and, therefore, it has 
considerably improved access to data. However, the sheer existence of data is not enough – it 
should also be easily extractable and comparable over time in order to enable systematic 
comparisons and analysis of the trends over time. At present, the General Secretariat is 
considering how to provide to all interested parties standardised reports with structured data in 
regular time intervals (Interview no. 2).  
There are also challenges with the reliability of data (see Blomeyer and Sanz, 2015, p. 
30 on organisation name entries). Data reliability is safeguarded by the formal rules of the 
Register. In practice, however, there are duplications and divergence in reporting the group 
membership due to the lack of formal cross-checking among the different DGs convening the 
expert group (Interview no. 2). Taking measures to ensure that the Commission’s Secretariat 
General has the mandate and resources to achieve data accuracy and reliability is still a very 
important priority. Otherwise, the advantages of better information provision cannot be fully 
converted into a better understanding of who actually participates in the expert groups. 
 
3.2.  A better balance in the representation of corporate and civil society interests? 
 
In this sub-section we take stock of the measures undertaken by the Commission to address 
the frequent critiques regarding the composition and operation of its expert groups. Civil 
society organisations (ALTER-EU, 2008, 2013, 2016), the European Parliament (see 
Blomeyer and Sanz, 2015) and the European Ombudsman (2014, 2016) have systematically 
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raised concerns about major deficiencies in the advisory structures of the EU executive, such 
as an inconsistent categorisation of expert group members, an overrepresentation of corporate 
interests and, notably, frequent instances of conflict of interest for individual experts 
appointed in their personal capacity (the so-called type A experts in Table 1). The instances of 
conflict of interest are a key concern for NGO stakeholders, observers and academics alike, 
because they show that representatives of business interests can assume the position of 
“experts,” while in practice these actors engage in policy advocacy. Such practices may 
eventually lead to corporate dominance and may skew legislation toward the preferences of 
the most well-organised business interests. The strategic use of the “corporate capture” 
message in the media and in election rallies has contributed to the gradual erosion of the 
general public’s trust in expert judgment and policy proposals.  
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Table 1: Categorisation of experts for the purposes of the Register of Commission Expert 
Groups 
Type A Individuals appointed in a personal capacity, acting independently and 
expressing their own personal views. 
Type B Individuals appointed to represent a common interest shared by stakeholder 
organisations in a particular policy area. They do not represent individual 
stakeholders, but a particular orientation common to different stakeholder 
organisations. They may be proposed by stakeholder organisations. 
Type C Organisations in the broad sense of the word including companies, 
associations, NGOs, trade unions, universities, research institutes, law firms 
and consultancies. 
Type D Member States’ authorities – national, regional or local. 
Type E Other public entities, such as authorities from non-EU countries (including 
candidate countries), EU bodies, offices or agencies, and international 
organisations.  
Source: European Commission (2016a) 
The Brussels-based Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation, 
commonly known as ALTER-EU, has been particularly concerned about instances of 
corporate capture in EU policy-making and has collected evidence of such activities. 
According to their assessment, “big business interests, meaning corporate lobbyists dominate 
EGs” (ALTER-EU, 2013, p. 3). For example, they estimated that in 2013 almost 80% of the 
new appointments to the EGs of the DG Taxation and Customs Union represented corporate 
interests (ALTER-EU, 2013, p. 3). Similarly, Chalmers (2014, p. 976) has found that being a 
member in an expert group depends on “superior resources, EU-level interests and existing 
institutionalised ties to decision-makers.” In 2018, ALTER-EU still continues to encounter 
business and industry-dominated EGs (Interview no. 3).  
The potential problem with type A experts outlined above is not unique. The other expert 
categories are also open to corporate overrepresentation and, hence, to potential bias in the 
issued expert advice. While it is challenging to produce an exact estimate of the degree of 
domestic corporate capture in the EU member states, it cannot be ruled out that the 
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representatives of the member states (type D) and of other public authorities (type E) could be 
advocating for particular business interest despite the signed conflict of interest declaration 
(Interview no. 3). Such model of influence would additionally amplify business/industry 
preferences during the expert deliberations. While the avenues of advocacy of private interests 
via the type A or type D/E categories is rather indirect, type B and C experts are overt and 
direct channels for representation of special interests in Commission EGs. This is why our 
analysis now turns to examining the composition of experts per type and DG. 
Table 2: Number of experts per type and per Commission DG 
DG Type A Type B Type C Type D Type E Total 
AGRI 62   461 308   831 
BUDG 5     56   61 
CLIMA     42 112 10 164 
CNECT 63 1 109 527 10 710 
COMP       28   28 
DEVCO     56 364 1 421 
DGT 10         10 
EAC 21   63 460 101 645 
ECFIN     16 159 7 182 
ECHO       192 28 220 
EMPL 21 191 276 879 119 1486 
ENER 4   64 557 10 635 
ENV 23   299 1501 100 1923 
EPSO       28   28 
ESTAT 6   1 2229 97 2333 
FISMA 18 48 125 263 12 466 
FPI       28   28 
GROW 49 26 777 2279 191 3322 
HOME 31   58 751 67 907 
HR       55   55 
JRC 12   1 27   40 
JUST 129 67 87 780 47 1110 
MARE 32 4 58 205 11 310 
MOVE 17 2 567 1031 100 1717 
OLAF       112 3 115 
REGIO 30   60 196 15 301 
RTD 625 65 99 201 59 1049 
SANTE 119   277 1360 93 1849 
SG 5 18 22 112 4 161 
TAXUD 14   217 1805 66 2102 
TRADE   30 28 224   282 




Source: European Commission, Register of EGs, 6 February 2018 
Table 2 shows considerable variation in the composition of the expert groups, and 
respectively in the proportion of the five types of experts, across DGs and policy sectors. 
Moreover, the variation is even greater at the level of the individual experts: within the type B 
and type C experts, there are further categories to be explored, such as trade/business 
association, company, NGO, academia or research institute. Critical observers, such as 
ALTER-EU or the Ombudsman, suspect that “corporate capture” is facilitated precisely by 
the (dis)balance at this sub-category level. For these reasons, in November 2011, the 
European Parliament put a reserve on the Expert Group Budget and posed to the Commission 
four conditions under which the reserve would be lifted (Blomeyer and Sanz, 2015, p. 16). 
Additionally, the Ombudsman, Emily O’Reilly, insisted in 2014 and again in 2016 on several 
measures with regard to the Commission’s EGs (European Ombudsman, 2014, p. 5). Among 
the demands is the achievement of a balanced composition of the expert groups, linking the 
Register of EGs with the Transparency Register and releasing regular public calls for 
applications. 
In principle, the Commission DGs have full discretion regarding whether to convene an 
EG and who will participate in it. Unlike the Commission’s comitology committees, which 
have a stronger legal basis, the pre-legislative EGs do not have to follow a strictly prescribed 
process of group selection. Still, some adjustments have taken place despite the DGs’ 
relatively high discretion in the convening and management of the EGs. Particularly, the 
Juncker Commission (in office since 2014) declared transparency and accountability to be a 
high priority and, therefore, it has undertaken a number of measures to achieve these 
objectives. For example, it releases a public call for applications for every expert group, with 
a four-week minimum6 deadline for all calls. Furthermore, type B and C experts are now 
obliged to also register themselves in the EU’s Transparency Register. Lastly, the 
Commission has put in place new and more systematic checks of potential conflict of interest 
for individual experts appointed in their personal capacity to make sure that type A experts do 
not represent industrial/private sector interest under the guise of “serving in a personal 
capacity.” 
These measures have been recommended by the European Ombudsman (2014, p. 5) and 
have gradually taken concrete shape through the revised Horizontal Rules (2016), the 
 
6 Exceptions are made in case of emergency and also for the member state authorities which can appoint their 
own EG representatives. 
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consecutive new releases of the Register and by establishing a link between the Register of 
EGs and the Transparency Register (2017). The changes fit well with the renewed emphasis 
that the Juncker administration has placed on the ethical aspects of EU governance, such as 
the publication of meeting agendas of the Commissioners, their cabinet members, and of the 
Directors-General as well as the requirement that Commissioners do not to meet with 
organisations (or self-employed individuals) which are not registered in the Transparency 
Register. Another step toward greater transparency is the Commission’s commitment to come 
forward with a proposal for a mandatory Transparency Register (Interview no. 1). 
Furthermore, the revised Horizontal Rules oblige each expert group (or rather its designated 
administrative support from the DG) to timely provide the agenda and the relevant other 
documents on the respective EGs webpage. This can be considered as adjustment in line with 
the requests for greater accountability and transparency in the functioning of the EGs 
(Interview no. 2). 
Have the changes outlined above led to a better balance in the expert groups? Next we 
evaluate the effects of the recent changes on the composition of the expert groups to 
supplement recent findings (Gornitzka and Sverdrup, 2011; Metz, 2015; Blomeyer and Sanz, 
2015) with new evidence about variation in the consulted types of experts.  
Figure 3: Percentage change in types of experts in the Commission Expert Groups, 2014-
2018 
 


























Figure 4: The balance between different types of exerts in the Commission Expert Groups, 
2014-2018 
 
Source: European Commission data, Register of EGs (2018) 
Figures 3 and 4 suggest that the demands to re-label type A experts have been largely 
addressed, as shown by the decreased number of consulted type A experts in the period 2013-
2018. There is an indication that the number of consulted type C experts also decreased in 
2018 compared to 2015. To explore these insights more in-depth, we need the breakdown per 
subcategory of experts and policy sector, which is not available from the Register of EGs but 
from the EU’s Transparency Register.7 This register contains data in six categories, depending 
on the type of represented interest:  
I. Professional consultancies/law firms/self-employed consultants 
II. In-house lobbyists and trade/business/professional associations 
III. Non-governmental organisations 
IV. Think tanks, research and academic institutions 
V. Organisations representing churches and religious communities 
VI. Organisations representing local, regional and municipal authorities, other 
public or mixed entities 
 
7 The requirement that all type B and C experts should be registered in the Transparency Register allows cross-
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According to the Transparency Register classification, the type I and II categories 
stand for business and corporate interests, while types III, IV, V and VI indicate public and 
NGO interest representation. Focusing on the policy sectors of the two case studies in section 
4, Finance and Environment, we cluster the data in two categories to gauge the balance 
between private business interests, on the one hand, and public and NGO interests on the 
other hand. The results presented in Table 3 below indicate a two to one prevalence of private 
business interests over public and NGO ones.  
Table 3: Distribution of interest representation per category of the Transparency Register for 
the sectors of Environment and Finance (March 2018) 
  
Types I and II 
 
Types III, IV, V and VI 
Finance 41 (66%) 21 (34%) 
Environment 188 (63%) 110 (37%) 
All policy domains 
(entire Transparency 
Register) 
7085 (60%) 4600 (40%) 
Source: European Commission data, Transparency Register (2018) 
While the general distribution of interest representation in the two analysed sectors 
showed that business interests have a more substantial representation, it is unclear what the 
implications of this trend may be for the composition of expert groups and the deliberations 
and decision-making in individual EGs. Therefore, the next two sections focus on unpacking 
expert group advice in two particular cases.   
4. Adaptation pathways at the level of individual expert groups 
 
After reviewing the macro level adaptations, we now turn to concrete adjustment pathways at 
the micro level. We examine two highly salient policy areas where recent legislative changes 
have been introduced. The key questions are how the Commission manages the heterogeneity 
of actors and views, in particular among type C experts, and how it copes with the growing 
structural contestation of expert advice. In addition, we assess the relationship between the 
Commission and its expert groups using Metz’ (2013, 2015) typology of: (1) problem-
solving, (2) substantiating and (3) consensus-building use of expertise. 




Firstly, we investigate the High-Level Expert Group (HLEG) on Sustainable Finance (Expert 
Group E03485). This advisory expert group was created with a Commission decision and 
tasked with presenting “policy recommendations that: (a) sets out the scale and dimensions of 
the challenges and opportunities that sustainable finance presents; and (b) recommends a 
comprehensive programme of reforms to the EU financial policy framework, including a clear 
prioritisation and sequencing” (European Commission, 2016d, p. 3). The group had a year to 
submit a final report, including carrying out a stakeholder questionnaire and preparing an 
interim report. The case analysis draws on the HLEG’s reports, the minutes for each meeting 
obtained from the Register of the Commission’s Expert Groups as well as additional press 
releases and Commission documents. 
The HLEG consisted of 20 members and nine observers. Seven of the members were 
from the UK, four - from France, two - from the Netherlands, two – from Germany and one – 
from Sweden, Italy, Finland, Luxembourg and Poland, respectively. These are type B 
members: “individual expert appointed as a representative of a common interest” (Register, 
“Expert Group explained”). In terms of professional affiliation, the 20 members broadly 
belong to three groups: i) one academic, ii) three members from non-banks or non-profit 
organisations with a strong research interest in sustainability and iii) fourteen members from 
banks, funds or other private entities. The third group is the most numerous one and includes 
primarily banks and funds which see sustainability and the protection of the environment as a 
fundamental part of their business model, such as APG Group, Mirova, Climate Bonds, 
Eurosif, Novethic, Trucost, 2°initiative. Other members in the third group represent the more 
general banking sector landscape, such as ALECTA, the Polish Bank Association, Deka, 
Finance Finland, AMC Strategy, London Stock Exchange, Luxembourg Stock Exchange and 
Aviva. The HLEG members did not include individuals working in a personal capacity or 
representatives of the member states’ authorities. 
The observer members of the HLEG could take part in all meetings and can be 
categorised as type C and type E experts. It is evident from meeting documents that the 
observers also participated actively in the discussions, which is in line with point 8 of the 
Rules of Procedure (Register, “HLEG”, Agenda 11th-12th September 2017). The type C expert 
observers were the European Association of Long-Term Investors, the International Capital 
Market Association and the Nordic-Investment Bank. Participating type E observers were 
European agencies and international institutions, such as the European Environment Agency, 
the European Investment Bank, the European Systemic Risk Board, the Single Resolution 
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Board, the United Nations Environment Programme and the United Nations Principles for 
Responsible Investment. In sum, the financial industry was well-represented in the 
composition of the HLEG group. In addition, type C and E observers came from more 
heterogeneous international backgrounds.  
The Commission’ selection procedure for the HLEG defined that the group’s 
composition should ensure “a geographical and a gender balance, as well as a balanced 
representation of relevant know how and areas of interest” (European Commission, 2016c, p. 
7). However, more than half of the members were from the UK and France, which suggests an 
overrepresentation of member states with large banking sectors. In terms of gender balance, 
there were seven female and thirteen male experts. The prevalence of male experts and the 
male leadership of the HLEG is somewhat surprising, considering that sustainable finance 
generally exhibits more gender equality (Robinson-Tillett, 2017).  
The HLEG included experts from banks and funds which are interested in sustainability 
issues. However, the group did not include stakeholders that hold more “exceptional” views 
about sustainability in finance. Jeucken and Bouma (2001, p. 34) explain that in sustainable 
banking, the “bank does not look for the highest financial rate of return, but for the highest 
sustainable rate of return, while being profitable in the long run.” Organisations advocating 
this view and more radical policy change, such as introducing capital requirements with 
sustainability weightings, are the Global Alliance for Banking on Values (GABV), Finance 
Watch and Mission 2020. Due to the exclusion of these more “extreme” actors and the 
resulting more mainstream industry composition, the expert group reflected more 
“mainstream” business interests. In turn, this led to less contestation in the group deliberations 
and outcomes.  
The HLEG’s mandate was quite broad. The Commission (2016d, p. 3) requested a “set 
of policy recommendations … with a comprehensive programme of reforms to the EU 
financial policy framework”. Content-wise, the aim was to achieve increased investment in 
sustainable investment projects as well as to ensure that financial institutions and supervisors 
“protect the stability of the financial system from risks related to the environment” 
(Commission 2016d, p. 3). Lastly, the Commission was interested in policies applicable to the 
entire EU in the context of the single market and, especially, geared toward consolidating the 
EU’s leadership in sustainable finance. 
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The HLEG’s broad scope is also reflected in the group’s initial search for an appropriate 
definition of “sustainable finance”. A clear definition sets boundaries to what will be included 
or excluded in the discussions. With the first meeting the DG FISMA introduced “relevant 
issues/challenges to enhancing sustainable finance such as definitions and analytical tools/ 
processes” (Register, HLEG, Minutes 25th January 2017, p. 2). Subsequently, multiple 
definitions of “sustainable finance” were given in the interim report but they still remained 
rather broad, such as “finance fostering sustainable economic, social and environmental 
development” (HLEG, 2017a, p. 12). 
A distinctive feature of the HLEG’s deliberations is that there is no evidence of a high 
level of contestation within the group during the discussions. In the group’s second meeting, 
the participants agreed on “integrating sustainability into the functioning of the EU 
Financial System” (Register, E03485, Minutes 6th March 2017, p.2). This would be achieved 
through three sets of actions: first, the adoption of different procedures in the “investment and 
lending chain”, second, reducing “long-term and sustainability risks” and, third, answering to 
“structural obstacles and time misalignments” (ibid.). The early HLEG recommendations in 
the interim report further elaborated on these three sets of actions. Table 4 below summarises 
the interim and final list of recommendations, including the extent of change observed. The 
HLEG’s final report, published in January 2018, contained five key recommendations, 
effectively omitting some of the more controversial recommendations formulated in the 
interim report. One possible explanation for the shorter list in the final report is feasibility, 
given the group’s mandate: “The group will need to prioritise those areas where the highest 
leverage impact can be, particularly since urgent change is needed” (Register, HLEG, Minutes 
24th January 2017, p. 2). The final list of recommendations is geared toward more 
harmonisation in sustainable financial products and working methods across the EU and 
matches the indicated priorities well. 
In sum, considering the high contestation of financial sector legislation since 2008, we 
expected to find more strategic use of expertise (Schrefler, 2010) in the case of the HLEG, 
which was indeed the case. The relatively homogenous composition of the expert group 
enabled the chair to steer the deliberations and, subsequently, the policy recommendations 
toward more moderate and pragmatic goals. Revisiting Metz’ (2013) typology of the uses of 
expertise, this is in line with a substantiating use in order to further strengthen and harmonise 
the internal market in financial services as well as a consensus-building use in order to 
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identify broad areas of agreement on key priorities shared among the different HLEG 
members.  
Table 4: Interim and final recommendations of the HLEG on Sustainable Finance 
 
 Recommendations in the 
Interim Report (2017a)  
Extent of 
change  
Recommendations in the Final 
Report (January 2018) 
1 “A classification system for 
sustainable assets” (p. 55) 
No change “Establish and maintain a common 
sustainability taxonomy at the EU 
level” (p. 15) 
2 “A European standard and label 
for green bonds and other 
sustainable assets, as well as 
labels for sustainable funds” (p. 
56) 
No change  “Develop and implement official 
European sustainability standards 
and labels, starting with green 
bonds” (p. 30) 
“Key elements of a retail strategy 
on sustainable finance: investment 
advice, ecolabel and SRI minimum 
standards” (p. 27) 
3 “Fiduciary duty that encompasses 




“Clarify investor duties to better 
embrace long-term horizon and 
sustainability preferences” (p. 20) 
4 “Disclosures for sustainability” 
(p. 57) 
 “Upgrade disclosure rules to make 
sustainability risks fully 
transparent, starting with climate 
change” (p. 23) 
5 “A sustainability test in financial 
legislation” (p. 58) 
Deleted -  
6 “Create ´Sustainable 
Infrastructure Europe`” (p. 58) 
No change “Establish ‘Sustainable 
Infrastructure Europe’” (p. 34) 
7 “Position the European 
supervisory agencies on 
sustainability” (p. 59) 
Deleted -  
8 “Accounting standards for energy 





“Accelerate action to finance 
energy efficiency investments” (p. 
59) 
9   “Governance and Leadership” (p. 
38) 
10   “Include sustainability in the 
supervisory mandate of the ESAs 
and extend the horizon of risk 





4.2. Case study of the Industrial Emissions Directive Article 13 Forum 
 
The expert group E02611 is formally called “Expert Group on the exchange of information on 
Best Available Techniques related to industrial emissions” but it is commonly known as “IED 
Article 13 Forum.” The group was established in 2011, in compliance with Article 13 of the 
Industrial Emissions Directive (IED) - 2010/75/EU Recast. It is the successor to the 
Information Exchange Forum, created under the previous Integrated Pollution Prevention and 
Control Directive 2008/1/EC. Both Directives define the framework for issuing environmental 
permits to large industrial installations (refineries, iron and steel plants, etc.) on the territory 
of the European Union, and aim to control and reduce pollution from these largest industrial 
sources. 
The regulatory approach pursued in the IED is co-regulatory – the regulated parties 
actively participate in the process of standard-setting which has to be complied with – through 
the provision of data about levels of industrial emissions released in the environment (air, 
water and soil). This mode of steering brings many advantages: it is more inclusive, ensures 
active stakeholder participation and a more deliberative nature of the governance process. 
Furthermore, it brings about lower transaction costs of negotiating an agreement between 
heterogeneous actors, higher levels of compliance and lower costs of the regulatory process 
itself (Koutalakis et al., 2010, pp. 330-331; Best, 2003). The IED previews (Article 13) an 
information exchange about the levels of industrial emissions between member states, the 
industries concerned, non-governmental organisations promoting environmental protection 
and the Commission. This exchange takes place via the IED Article 13 Forum, which was 
created as a formal expert group through Commission decision (2011/C 146/03) of 16 May 
2011, whereby the lead DG is Environment and the Joint Research Centre (JRC) is the 
associated DG. The main function of the Forum is to assure the largest possible consensus 
regarding the BAT reference documents described below (known as BREF). The BREFs are 
drafted in a complex procedure known as the Sevilla process led by the European Integrated 
Pollution Prevention and Control Bureau (EIPPCB), which is part of the Joint Research 
Centre. The Forum plays a coordinative role and steers the general and horizontal aspects of 
the information exchange (Schoenberger, 2009, p. 1527). Furthermore, the Technical 
Working Groups (TWGs) are made up technical experts representing the member states, 
industry or NGOs and play an important role in drawing up and reviewing the BREFs.  
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There are more than 50,000 large industrial installations in the EU which must operate 
according to the EU standards for prevention and control of pollution, and therefore obtain an 
environmental permit that certifies that. The permit confirms compliance with binding 
emission limits (e.g. for sulphur dioxide) based on a set of Best Available Techniques (BATs) 
endorsed for the Union as a whole. The primary function of the expert group IED Article 13 
Forum is to draw up, review and update BAT reference documents (BREFs). The BREFs are 
complex technical manuals of hundreds of pages which set out norms and good practices in 
the management of industrial emissions. Once drafted with the largest possible consensus 
(Article 13 IED) and adopted – by a Comitology committee (Article 75 IED) – the BREFs are 
used by the member state authorities as the reference standard for setting permit conditions to 
large industrial installations. Clearly, the content of a BREF and especially the emission 
reference standards it endorses have far-reaching (material) consequences for the EU member 
states and their regulated industries. Therefore, the process of BREF endorsement is highly 
political.  
The main data sources used in the case study in order to reconstruct this contestation 
and the coping strategies on the side of the Commission are the available constitutive 
documents (e.g. the founding Commission decision, the Rules of Procedure) and the minutes 
of the IED Article 13 Forum available from the Register of Expert Groups. Moreover, an 
interview was conducted in the Unit C4 (Industrial Emissions) of DG Environment.  
In principle, all interested parties can express their interest in joining the TWGs or the 
Forum. The access is open and the selection starts with an expression of interest procedure 
which is managed by the Unit C4 of DG Environment. This is why there is a relatively large 
number of sectoral TWGs, encompassing more than 350 representatives, working on the 
various BREFs, of which more than 30 have already been endorsed. The Forum participants8 
vary between 90 and 100, whereby the majority of more than 50 are type C corporate experts 
next to the 28 experts from the member states (type D). There are about 10 type E experts – 
observers from the candidate and associated to the EU countries. The access to the exert 
group is thus open and not formally restricted, but experts must be knowledgeable about 
industrial emissions and be able to evaluate the underlying industrial installations and 
production processes. This is a serious hurdle for environmental NGOs, which are not able to 
collect data comprehensively, especially not about all member states. This is why the NGOs 
 




join forces and are represented by one umbrella NGO – the European Environmental Bureau 
(EEB). According to DG Environment, the EU-wide NGO platforms which aim to influence 
the decision-making process have acquired certain specialisation in order to concentrate 
resources and accumulate sufficient knowledge and expertise (Interview no. 4). Industrial 
emissions are thus “covered” by the EEB. Indeed, this is the NGO present at all ten Forum 
meetings conducted so far. For seven of them, it is the only NGO, while for three of them it is 
joined by the Climate Action Network (CAN Europe). 
The main line of contestation in the expert group is between the environmentally 
progressive and the environmentally conservative coalition (Interview no. 4). These are not 
homogenous groups, as beyond the traditionally protective NGOs environmentally 
progressive positions are defended also by several Northern European member states and also 
by the representatives of the industrial sector which have invested in expensive state-of-the art 
environmentally-friendly production technologies and smaller industrial emissions processes. 
Assessed from a purely quantitative perspective, this coalition has fewer members than the 
coalition advocating for the preservation of the status quo. However, the process is not 
strongly influenced by this numerical headcount because neither the TWG nor the Forum use 
voting to take decisions. On the contrary, expert discussions are often geared toward finding a 
middle ground between the progressive and the conservative coalitions. Moreover, only 
robustly documented evidence is considered, regardless of the source. Hence, the quantitative 
disparity in this EG is not seen as a disadvantage for the environmentally progressive 
coalition (Interview no. 4).  
According to the Commission (2018), the BREFs are “determined in a transparent 
manner, based on sound techno-economic information.” Indeed, the process is entirely based 
on documents and verifiable data, which can be and are challenged within the TWG 
discussions.  The chances for the Commission to be misled are minimal because in the 
process of open deliberations among such a large group of experts, potential inaccuracies are 
cancelled out (Interview no. 4). The middle-ground identified after the TWG expert 
discussions is spelled out by the EIPPCB and incorporated in the part of the draft BREFs 
which is labelled “under consensus.” All dissenting views are reported under the part of the 
document labelled “split views.” The BREF is then submitted to the IED Article 13 Forum, 
which is required to provide its opinion to the Article 75 committee no later than eight weeks 
prior to the meeting of the committee. 
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As already mentioned, the main function of the Forum discussions is to generate the 
broadest possible consensus to underpin the draft BREF, as submitted by the TWG. The 
discussions at this level are not technical but oriented toward finding an agreement – the 
Forum looks for the feasible concessions to even out the so-called “split views.” When the 
Forum succeeds in reconciling the different views, the Commission reports the comments as 
“consensual within the Forum.” The remaining comments are categorised as “representing the 
views of certain Forum members.” This categorisation at the level of the TWG and of the 
Forum allows a single BREF to be proposed to the Article 75 committee, which votes on an 
implementing act that incorporates it. Given the open access to the expert group and the 
ensuing heterogeneity of views, it is only via robust documentation of the lines of agreement 
and disagreement that the process of contestation can be feasibly managed. The non-
consensual comments are annexed to the opinion of the Article 13 Forum and offered to the 
Article 75 committee. Moreover, the opinion of the Forum is publicly available, and minutes9 
are kept of every meeting. 
 
4.3. High Contestation and Strategic Use of Expertise  
 
Overall, referring to the conceptualisation of Metz (2013, 2015) about problem-solving, 
substantiating and consensus-building uses of expertise, the two case studies show a frequent 
interplay between the different uses. In the finance case study (Expert Group E03485), we 
observe some problem-solving use: the experts’ factual and practical knowledge of 
sustainable finance products was used when drafting the EG’s recommendations. Intertwined 
with this use, we find substantiating use to achieve greater market harmonisation. The very 
selection of experts with more moderate views when the HLEG was set up limited the range 
of debated views and policy options to more modest measures which help to expand the single 
market in finance with a new range of sustainable finance products and working methods, but 
which do not require a big revision of the status quo. This indicates a consensus-building use 
of expertise intertwined with the substantiating one. 
The use of expertise in the IED Article 13 Forum (or Expert group E02611) is also of 
mixed nature. In the case of the IED Article 13 Forum (Expert Group E02611), the 
 
9 Available from the Register of Commission Expert Groups at: 




predominant use of expertise is for consensus-building, but the problem-solving use is 
prevalent in the TWGs. In fact, the TWGs are the core arena of the discussions requiring 
technical expertise, while the Forum aims to clarify and to achieve the broadest possible 
consensus alongside the draft BREF proposed by the TWG. If compared to the vertical 
negotiations in the Council of the European Union, the work of the Forum is similar to the 
political role of COREPER (Interview no. 4), while the Technical Working Group (TWG) – 
functioning under the Forum and chaired by the EIPPCB – conducts the detailed and more 
technocratic expert analysis.  
5. Conclusion 
 
Some level of acknowledgment that expertise has a political function or that “the technical is 
political” (Bijker et al., 2009; see also Weiss, 1979; Schrefler, 2010) has always been present 
in social science scholarship. The post-truth debates have emphasized and mainstreamed such 
claims and pointed to the interconnectedness between the instrumental and strategic uses of 
expert advice in the practice of public administrations. This chapter examined how the central 
technocratic institution of the EU – the European Commission - has sought to better legitimise 
its usage of expertise, considering the mobilization by some politicians of the message that 
experts are strategically used by policy-makers to justify political choices and the resulting 
policy does not respond to the concerns of the “ordinary citizen.” While the Commission is 
still searching for the right mix between a technical and a political use of expertise in its 
advisory structures, our analysis shows that experts continue to play an important problem-
solving role in the European policy process. 
We investigated one important line of contestation of expert advice, namely, that expert 
groups are more responsive to corporate interests, compared to other stakeholders. The main 
finding is that neither at the macro nor at the micro level of analysis was there decisive 
evidence of “corporate capture.” The macro level analysis in section 3 showed that the 
Commission has made substantial investment in increasing the procedural transparency of the 
system of expert groups through implementing the new Horizontal Rules (2016), establishing 
a link between the Transparency Register and the Register of Expert Groups (2017), reducing 
the number of type A experts and rebalancing the prevalence of type B and C experts. These 
efforts aim to enhance the transparency of the expert groups’ work and to address critiques 
about experts making decisions “behind closed doors.” Relating our findings to more general 
studies of organisational change in the EU, our results confirm the thesis of Moodie (2015, p. 
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236) that the Commission is responsive toward the policy environment and pro-actively 
adapts to new challenges, such as the greater structural contestation of expert advice. 
Nevertheless, the adjustment approach is rather formal and aims to keep the established 
models and administrative routines. The observed adjustments are in line with what Boswell 
(2008) has labelled a “reinterpretation strategy,” namely, reform measures which do not 
introduce a thorough in-depth revision of administrative practices, routines and internal 
working processes and, thus, do not affect the “deep core” of an organisation’s set-up and 
operations. 
Furthermore, the micro level analysis in the two case studies of section 4 showed that 
there is a reliance on a more strategic (consensus-building) use of expertise, which helped to 
narrow down the range of viewpoints and, consequently, the issues within the scope of the EG 
deliberations. Eventually, this facilitates the identification of compromises and acceptable 
policy solutions rather than overturning the status quo. The overall outcome of the expert 
groups’ advice in the case studies is a gradual progress toward reaching the overarching 
policy goals: making the financial sector more sustainable and setting lower limits of 
industrial pollution. 
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